

1 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bross

SUBJECT : TOD, Intelligence Program Review, and the Future.

1. The presentation of the initial TOD report will hopefully raise a number of questions at the DCI-SECDEF policy level. In TOD we have been developing a US Intelligence Community program structure for which there is current "use" plan. A decision to go on with the TOD development implicitly, if not explicitly, assumes inclusion of FY 1969 and 1970, and eventually the five-year program. It also assumes updating and the cyclical output of TOD. Anything less would hardly justify continuance of such an effort.

2. However, to continue TOD along these lines only serves to point out the redundancy and duplication of administrative burdens in preparing data for the CIP, CCP and NRP, in particular. It should also point out that the current review process in these programs as separate entities and actions leaves something to be desired.

3. For example, it would appear much more reasonable to review resources and programming in the Collection of Foreign Intelligence along with related programs in a single program review where one could regard the effort and issues related to specific areas and objectives regardless of organizations involved.

4. It is doubtful that the TOD Committee will open the door on the problem of such functional-objective review and one can argue that it is best that they do not do so. The factor which looms largest in this area is the OSD program.

5. We can say without any doubt that DIA, NSA, and NRO would be opposed to a functional-objective program review process. It also appears probable that on the Assistant Secretary level, the opposition of DDR&E and even Systems Analysis would be likely. The fact is that the immediate impact of such a review process would tend to reduce the baronial power centers of agencies and shift primary action levels in the existing program review structure. The new review process would place them in an environment where they would be competing, instead of controlling and "log rolling." It is this very competition and visibility which would increase the intelligence management capabilities at the DCI-SECDEF level.

6. All of this is fine in concept. The realities of arriving at an implementation plan for such a review process becomes the important fact of life if we assume DCI-SECDEF policy agreement.

7. There would be no easier way to kill the effectiveness of a functional objective program review process than to set up an implementation plan committee with representatives from the very organizations who have the greatest stake in maintaining the status quo. To have such organizations critique such an implementation plan and engage in policy dialogues at agency and staff levels is obviously essential to good management. However, the plan itself must be originated at and by the level it is primarily designed to serve.

8. How can this be done? Is the time "ripe" and are the people involved compatible enough? Could and would the DCI set down the basic framework for a US intelligence program resource review process? Could he and would he approach the Secretary of Defense and other policy levels with a proposed implementation plan?

9. Of course, one cannot presume to know the answer to such questions. We, in NIPE, ostensibly believe in the concept of the DCI as the leader of US Intelligence. We, in NIPE, have the experience and capability to do the staff work necessary to construct the framework for a functional-objective program review structure for US intelligence. Or are we even ready to begin the dialogue?

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